Commit 7c7b562c authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'gcc-plugin-cleanup-v4.19-rc1' of...

Merge tag 'gcc-plugin-cleanup-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull gcc plugin cleanups from Kees Cook:

 - Kconfig and Makefile clean-ups (Masahiro Yamada, Kees Cook)

 - gcc-common.h definition clean-ups (Alexander Popov)

* tag 'gcc-plugin-cleanup-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros
  gcc-plugins: Regularize Makefile.gcc-plugins
  gcc-plugins: split out Kconfig entries to scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
  gcc-plugins: remove unused GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR
parents b125d903 45d9a1e3
......@@ -408,150 +408,6 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details.
preferred-plugin-hostcc := $(if-success,[ $(gcc-version) -ge 40800 ],$(HOSTCXX),$(HOSTCC))
config PLUGIN_HOSTCC
string
default "$(shell,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh "$(preferred-plugin-hostcc)" "$(HOSTCXX)" "$(CC)")"
help
Host compiler used to build GCC plugins. This can be $(HOSTCXX),
$(HOSTCC), or a null string if GCC plugin is unsupported.
config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
bool
help
An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with
GCC plugins.
menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
bool "GCC plugins"
depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != ""
help
GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details.
config GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY
bool "Compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function" if EXPERT
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
help
The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as:
M = E - N + 2P
where
E = the number of edges
N = the number of nodes
P = the number of connected components (exit nodes).
Enabling this plugin reports the complexity to stderr during the
build. It mainly serves as a simple example of how to create a
gcc plugin for the kernel.
config GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV
bool
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
help
This plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call at the start of
basic blocks. It supports all gcc versions with plugin support (from
gcc-4.5 on). It is based on the commit "Add fuzzing coverage support"
by Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>.
config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
bool "Generate some entropy during boot and runtime"
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
help
By saying Y here the kernel will instrument some kernel code to
extract some entropy from both original and artificially created
program state. This will help especially embedded systems where
there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally. The cost
is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
irq processing.
Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
secure!
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
* https://grsecurity.net/
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
bool "Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses"
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
# Currently STRUCTLEAK inserts initialization out of live scope of
# variables from KASAN point of view. This leads to KASAN false
# positive reports. Prohibit this combination for now.
depends on !KASAN_EXTRA
help
This plugin zero-initializes any structures containing a
__user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information
exposures.
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
* https://grsecurity.net/
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
bool "Force initialize all struct type variables passed by reference"
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
depends on !COMPILE_TEST
help
Zero initialize any struct type local variable that may be passed by
reference without having been initialized.
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
help
This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
help
If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely
function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
__no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
types.
Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
The seed used for compilation is located at
scripts/gcc-plgins/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after
a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with
the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or
make distclean.
Note that the implementation requires gcc 4.7 or newer.
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
* https://grsecurity.net/
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization"
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
depends on !COMPILE_TEST # do not reduce test coverage
help
If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a
best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
groups of elements. It will further not randomize bitfields
in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
at the cost of weakened randomization.
config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
bool
help
......@@ -975,3 +831,5 @@ config REFCOUNT_FULL
security flaw exploits.
source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY) += cyc_complexity_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) += latent_entropy_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) += -DLATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) \
+= -DLATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-latent_entropy_plugin-disable
DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-latent_entropy_plugin-disable
endif
export DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV) += sancov_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK) += structleak_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE) += -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-verbose
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL) += -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-byref-all
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK) += -DSTRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE) \
+= -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-verbose
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL) \
+= -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-byref-all
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK) \
+= -DSTRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) += randomize_layout_plugin.so
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) += -DRANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE) += -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) \
+= -DRANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE) \
+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
# All the plugin CFLAGS are collected here in case a build target needs to
# filter them out of the KBUILD_CFLAGS.
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
export GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR
export DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
# sancov_plugin.so can be only in CFLAGS_KCOV because avoid duplication.
# The sancov_plugin.so is included via CFLAGS_KCOV, so it is removed here.
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(filter-out %/sancov_plugin.so, $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS))
export GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS
# Add the flags to the build!
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS)
# All enabled GCC plugins are collected here for building below.
GCC_PLUGIN := $(gcc-plugin-y)
GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR := $(gcc-plugin-subdir-y)
export GCC_PLUGIN
# Actually do the build, if requested.
PHONY += gcc-plugins
......
preferred-plugin-hostcc := $(if-success,[ $(gcc-version) -ge 40800 ],$(HOSTCXX),$(HOSTCC))
config PLUGIN_HOSTCC
string
default "$(shell,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh "$(preferred-plugin-hostcc)" "$(HOSTCXX)" "$(CC)")"
help
Host compiler used to build GCC plugins. This can be $(HOSTCXX),
$(HOSTCC), or a null string if GCC plugin is unsupported.
config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
bool
help
An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with
GCC plugins.
menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
bool "GCC plugins"
depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != ""
help
GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details.
if GCC_PLUGINS
config GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY
bool "Compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function" if EXPERT
depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
help
The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as:
M = E - N + 2P
where
E = the number of edges
N = the number of nodes
P = the number of connected components (exit nodes).
Enabling this plugin reports the complexity to stderr during the
build. It mainly serves as a simple example of how to create a
gcc plugin for the kernel.
config GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV
bool
help
This plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call at the start of
basic blocks. It supports all gcc versions with plugin support (from
gcc-4.5 on). It is based on the commit "Add fuzzing coverage support"
by Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>.
config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
bool "Generate some entropy during boot and runtime"
help
By saying Y here the kernel will instrument some kernel code to
extract some entropy from both original and artificially created
program state. This will help especially embedded systems where
there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally. The cost
is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
irq processing.
Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
secure!
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
* https://grsecurity.net/
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
bool "Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses"
# Currently STRUCTLEAK inserts initialization out of live scope of
# variables from KASAN point of view. This leads to KASAN false
# positive reports. Prohibit this combination for now.
depends on !KASAN_EXTRA
help
This plugin zero-initializes any structures containing a
__user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information
exposures.
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
* https://grsecurity.net/
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
bool "Force initialize all struct type variables passed by reference"
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
depends on !COMPILE_TEST
help
Zero initialize any struct type local variable that may be passed by
reference without having been initialized.
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
help
This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
help
If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely
function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
__no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
types.
Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
The seed used for compilation is located at
scripts/gcc-plgins/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after
a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with
the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or
make distclean.
Note that the implementation requires gcc 4.7 or newer.
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
* https://grsecurity.net/
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization"
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
depends on !COMPILE_TEST # do not reduce test coverage
help
If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a
best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
groups of elements. It will further not randomize bitfields
in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
at the cost of weakened randomization.
endif
......@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ else
export HOST_EXTRACXXFLAGS
endif
export HOSTLIBS
$(obj)/randomize_layout_plugin.o: $(objtree)/$(obj)/randomize_layout_seed.h
quiet_cmd_create_randomize_layout_seed = GENSEED $@
cmd_create_randomize_layout_seed = \
......@@ -29,7 +27,4 @@ always := $($(HOSTLIBS)-y)
$(foreach p,$($(HOSTLIBS)-y:%.so=%),$(eval $(p)-objs := $(p).o))
subdir-y := $(GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR)
subdir- += $(GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR)
clean-files += *.so
......@@ -392,13 +392,6 @@ static inline struct cgraph_node *cgraph_alias_target(struct cgraph_node *n)
}
#endif
#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007 && BUILDING_GCC_VERSION <= 4009
#define cgraph_create_edge(caller, callee, call_stmt, count, freq, nest) \
cgraph_create_edge((caller), (callee), (call_stmt), (count), (freq))
#define cgraph_create_edge_including_clones(caller, callee, old_call_stmt, call_stmt, count, freq, nest, reason) \
cgraph_create_edge_including_clones((caller), (callee), (old_call_stmt), (call_stmt), (count), (freq), (reason))
#endif
#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION <= 4008
#define ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(FN) ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FUNCTION(FN)
#define EXIT_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(FN) EXIT_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FUNCTION(FN)
......@@ -723,10 +716,23 @@ static inline const char *get_decl_section_name(const_tree decl)
#define varpool_get_node(decl) varpool_node::get(decl)
#define dump_varpool_node(file, node) (node)->dump(file)
#define cgraph_create_edge(caller, callee, call_stmt, count, freq, nest) \
#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 8000
#define cgraph_create_edge(caller, callee, call_stmt, count, freq) \
(caller)->create_edge((callee), (call_stmt), (count))
#define cgraph_create_edge_including_clones(caller, callee, \
old_call_stmt, call_stmt, count, freq, reason) \
(caller)->create_edge_including_clones((callee), \
(old_call_stmt), (call_stmt), (count), (reason))
#else
#define cgraph_create_edge(caller, callee, call_stmt, count, freq) \
(caller)->create_edge((callee), (call_stmt), (count), (freq))
#define cgraph_create_edge_including_clones(caller, callee, old_call_stmt, call_stmt, count, freq, nest, reason) \
(caller)->create_edge_including_clones((callee), (old_call_stmt), (call_stmt), (count), (freq), (reason))
#define cgraph_create_edge_including_clones(caller, callee, \
old_call_stmt, call_stmt, count, freq, reason) \
(caller)->create_edge_including_clones((callee), \
(old_call_stmt), (call_stmt), (count), (freq), (reason))
#endif
typedef struct cgraph_node *cgraph_node_ptr;
typedef struct cgraph_edge *cgraph_edge_p;
......
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