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    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      Documentation/process: Embargoed hardware security issues · ddaedbbe
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      To address the requirements of embargoed hardware issues, like Meltdown,
      Spectre, L1TF etc. it is necessary to define and document a process for
      handling embargoed hardware security issues.
      
      Following the discussion at the maintainer summit 2018 in Edinburgh
      (https://lwn.net/Articles/769417/
      
      ) the volunteered people have worked
      out a process and a Memorandum of Understanding.  The latter addresses
      the fact that the Linux kernel community cannot sign NDAs for various
      reasons.
      
      The initial contact point for hardware security issues is different from
      the regular kernel security contact to provide a known and neutral
      interface for hardware vendors and researchers. The initial primary
      contact team is proposed to be staffed by Linux Foundation Fellows, who
      are not associated to a vendor or a distribution and are well connected
      in the industry as a whole.
      
      The process is designed with the experience of the past incidents in
      mind and tries to address the remaining gaps, so future (hopefully rare)
      incidents can be handled more efficiently.  It won't remove the fact,
      that most of this has to be done behind closed doors, but it is set up
      to avoid big bureaucratic hurdles for individual developers.
      
      The process is solely for handling hardware security issues and cannot
      be used for regular kernel (software only) security bugs.
      
      This memo can help with hardware companies who, and I quote, "[my
      manager] doesn't want to bet his job on the list keeping things secret."
      This despite numerous leaks directly from that company over the years,
      and none ever so far from the kernel security team.  Cognitive
      dissidence seems to be a requirement to be a good manager.
      
      To accelerate the adoption of this  process, we introduce the concept of
      ambassadors in participating companies. The ambassadors are there to
      guide people to comply with the process, but are not automatically
      involved in the disclosure of a particular incident.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190815212505.GC12041@kroah.com
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      ddaedbbe