• Andrey Ryabinin's avatar
    kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure · 0b24becc
    Andrey Ryabinin authored
    Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector.  It
    provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
    out-of-bounds bugs.
    KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
    therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required.  v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
    putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
    instrumentation of globals.
    This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer.  It's
    not available for use yet.  The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
    Basic idea:
    The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
    of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
    check the shadow memory on each memory access.
    Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
    memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
    memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
    Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
         unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
                    return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
    So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
    The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
    of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
    means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
    are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
    inaccessible.  Different negative values used to distinguish between
    different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
    To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
    Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
    __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
    These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
    checking corresponding shadow memory.  If access is not valid an error
    Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
    	"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
    	ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
    	them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
    	running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
    	scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
    	open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
    	lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
    	The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
    	We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
    	(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
    	start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
    	Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
    	We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
    	people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
    	As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
    	performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
    	shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
    	programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
    	kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
    	running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
    	have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
    	finish all tuning).
    	I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
    	working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
    	memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
    	others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
    	can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
    	if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
    	Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
    	instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
    	parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
    	relatively easy to port."
    Comparison with other debugging features:
      - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can.  KASan uses
        compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
        kmemcheck.  The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
        uninitialized memory reads.
        Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
        x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
    $ netperf -l 30
    		MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from ( port 0 AF_INET to localhost ( port 0 AF_INET
    		Recv   Send    Send
    		Socket Socket  Message  Elapsed
    		Size   Size    Size     Time     Throughput
    		bytes  bytes   bytes    secs.    10^6bits/sec
    no debug:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    41624.72
    kasan inline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    12870.54
    kasan outline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    10586.39
    kmemcheck: 	87380  16384  16384    30.03      20.23
      - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs.  It always sets
        number of CPUs to 1.  KASan doesn't have such limitation.
    	- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
    	  granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
    SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
    	- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
    	- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
    	  KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
    	- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
    	  bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
    	  bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
    	  place of first bad read/write.
    [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
    [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
    [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
    [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
    [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
    Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
    Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
    Acked-by: default avatarMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
    Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
    Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
    Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
    Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
    Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
    Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
    Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
    Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
    Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
    Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
    Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
    Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
    Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
    Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
    Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
    Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>