Commit 2fbd7af5 authored by Dan Williams's avatar Dan Williams Committed by Thomas Gleixner
Browse files

x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation

The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation.

While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it
does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory
relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache

Reported-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Williams <>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <>
parent c7f631cb
......@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
......@@ -282,7 +283,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs)
* regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls.
if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) {
regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK](
nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls);
regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr](
regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx,
regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9);
......@@ -318,6 +320,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs)
if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) {
nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls);
* It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation
* takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that
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