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  • linux-arm
  • linux-qy
  • Repository
  • linux-qy
  • drivers
  • ptp
  • ptp_chardev.c
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  • Gustavo A. R. Silva's avatar
    ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability · efa61c8c
    Gustavo A. R. Silva authored Oct 16, 2018
    pin_index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
    to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
    
    This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
    
    drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:253 ptp_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
    'ops->pin_config' [r] (local cap)
    
    Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index
    ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to
    function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index
    info->pin_config.
    
    Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
    to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
    completed with a dependent load/store [1].
    
    [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
    
    
    
    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
    Signed-off-by: default avatarGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
    Acked-by: default avatarRichard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    efa61c8c